The military training, which was mandatory, and held quite openly before 9/11, trained recruits in 'infantry tactics and small arms -- from handguns to assault rifles; rocket-propelled grenade launchers and shoulder-fired Surface to Air Missiles like the Stingers'.
Pakistani expert Arif Jamal said the jihadis 'usually follow a basic military course of 21 days to get minimum training in Kalashnikov handling, hand grenades, ambushing. You come back to get advanced training only when you are planning to practically wage jihad. Even those who have minimum guerrilla training are better fighters than the Pakistani policemen.'
Some of the training, organised at the Umar Kuka camp and the Abu Bashir camp in Bahawalpur in Punjab, included physical exercises, theory and practice of making bombs, guerrilla warfare and escape and interrogation methods. Lashkar was the first terrorist group to introduce suicide attacks in Kashmir.
The recruits were also trained to 'use all means of communication including short messaging services on mobile phones, chatting through the Internet, central messaging through bulletin boards on the net and electronic messaging. In these training classes, recruits were told to communicate with each other through word of mouth instead of mobiles as often as possible. If mobiles were used, then the sets were to be dismantled once the conversation was over.
They also were told to make mobile conversations at crowded locations like commercial centres where 'it is difficult for the security agencies to isolate them and listen in to their conversation to detect their whereabouts.'
There is also evidence of Lashkar training its recruits in amphibious operations. Well-known American scholar Steve Coll (author of Ghost Wars), wrote in the New Yorker on December 1, 2008, that 'under the guise of humanitarian relief operations, Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. Lashkar has rubber pontoon boats about 15ft long with a large outboard motor also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian Kashmir.' The terrorists who attacked Mumbai could also have been trained there.
Lashkar second-in-command, Abdur Rahman Makki, wrote in his book on suicide missions, Tareek-e-Islam Kay Fadayee Dastay, that 'it can be safely said that a fidayee action is not suicide, it is not killing oneself. It is only a style of fighting. Now-a-days, we hear of Lashkar-e-Tayiba mujahideen carrying out fidayee actions and returning safely by the blessing of Allaah Al-Mighty. The fidayee from Sargodha who carried out the 15 Corps Badami Bagh Srinagar fidayee action, Mujahid Salahud Din who led the fidayee attack at Srinagar airport and those who conducted the attack on the Delhi Red Fort, all returned safely after accomplishing their mission.'
Image: The Lashkar-e-Tayiba headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore.
Pakistani expert Arif Jamal said the jihadis 'usually follow a basic military course of 21 days to get minimum training in Kalashnikov handling, hand grenades, ambushing. You come back to get advanced training only when you are planning to practically wage jihad. Even those who have minimum guerrilla training are better fighters than the Pakistani policemen.'
Some of the training, organised at the Umar Kuka camp and the Abu Bashir camp in Bahawalpur in Punjab, included physical exercises, theory and practice of making bombs, guerrilla warfare and escape and interrogation methods. Lashkar was the first terrorist group to introduce suicide attacks in Kashmir.
The recruits were also trained to 'use all means of communication including short messaging services on mobile phones, chatting through the Internet, central messaging through bulletin boards on the net and electronic messaging. In these training classes, recruits were told to communicate with each other through word of mouth instead of mobiles as often as possible. If mobiles were used, then the sets were to be dismantled once the conversation was over.
They also were told to make mobile conversations at crowded locations like commercial centres where 'it is difficult for the security agencies to isolate them and listen in to their conversation to detect their whereabouts.'
There is also evidence of Lashkar training its recruits in amphibious operations. Well-known American scholar Steve Coll (author of Ghost Wars), wrote in the New Yorker on December 1, 2008, that 'under the guise of humanitarian relief operations, Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. Lashkar has rubber pontoon boats about 15ft long with a large outboard motor also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian Kashmir.' The terrorists who attacked Mumbai could also have been trained there.
Lashkar second-in-command, Abdur Rahman Makki, wrote in his book on suicide missions, Tareek-e-Islam Kay Fadayee Dastay, that 'it can be safely said that a fidayee action is not suicide, it is not killing oneself. It is only a style of fighting. Now-a-days, we hear of Lashkar-e-Tayiba mujahideen carrying out fidayee actions and returning safely by the blessing of Allaah Al-Mighty. The fidayee from Sargodha who carried out the 15 Corps Badami Bagh Srinagar fidayee action, Mujahid Salahud Din who led the fidayee attack at Srinagar airport and those who conducted the attack on the Delhi Red Fort, all returned safely after accomplishing their mission.'
Image: The Lashkar-e-Tayiba headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore.
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